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PRESERVING PEREMPTORIES: A
PRACTITIONER'S PREROGATIVE
Effective trial strategy mandates that attorneys select jurors
who are at least fair toward, or preferably, in favor of, their cli-
ent.' Successful advocacy further requires attorneys to identify
and strike, via a challenge for cause or an unexplained peremp-
tory challenge,2 venirepersons who may favor the opposition.3
Through voir dire,4 whereby potential jurors are questioned, attor-
neys can obtain information useful for both choosing fair jurors
and removing jurors who demonstrate an actual or potential bias
against their client.5
1 See JOAN M. BROVINS & THOMAS OEHM10, THE TRIAL PRACTICE GUIDE: STRATEGIES,
SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ATTORNEY 80 (1992). "In your eyes, jurors should be
biased in favor of your client and be able to return a favorable verdict." Id.
2 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990). "A peremptory challenge is the right
to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the chal-
lenge. In most jurisdictions each party to an action, both civil and criminal, has a specified
number of such challenges and after using all his peremptory challenges he is required to
furnish a reason for subsequent challenges." Id. Peremptory challenges are a legislative,
not constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1870 (West 1994) (granting right to peremptory
challenges in civil cases); FED. R. Cmnm. P. 24 (granting right to peremptory challenges in
criminal cases); see, e.g., N.Y. CIm. PRoc. LAW § 270.25(1) (McKinney 1993). "A peremp-
tory challenge is an objection to a prospective juror for which no reason need be assigned."
Id.; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (citing Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965)). "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is
that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject
to the court's control." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431; Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,
2358 (1992). Peremptory challenges "are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights;
rather they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury
and a fair trial." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358; E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Note, Discrimination
by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 355,
356 (1988).
3 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994). "Voir dire provides a means
of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exer-
cise their peremptory challenges intelligently." Id.; see generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Voir dire "facilitate[sI intelli-
gent exercise of peremptory challenges and [helps] uncover factors that would dictate dis-
qualification for cause." Id.
4 MARILYN BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY 164
(1989). Voir dire (to speak the truth) is the process by which attorneys choose triers of fact
for their case. Id.; see also THOMAS J. SANNITo & PETER J. McGovERN, COURTROOM PSY-
CHOLOGY FOR TRIAL LAwYERs § 2.1 (1985 & Supp. 1992). 'The term voir dire, in its narrow-
est meaning, refers to the advanced questioning of a potential juror or witness to determine
objectivity and truthfulness before [that individual] is allowed to become an official partici-
pant in the due process of a case." Id
5 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also BERGER ET AL., supra note
4, at 164 (discussing oral voir dire process and purpose).
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When selecting a jury, attorneys for both parties fundamentally
use their peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons whom
they perceive to be predisposed toward their opposition's position,6
particularly when personal biases are not sufficiently evident to
support a challenge for cause.7 Many litigators recognize that "the
case can be lost before it begins"8 if they fail to exclude jurors bi-
ased against them; therefore, attorneys consider voir dire "the
most crucial part of the trial."9 Trial strategists, illustrating the
importance of carefully selecting a jury, have analogized present-
ing a case to the "wrong jury" to "a maestro conduct[ing] a Beetho-
ven symphony at a meat-packing plant."10
The peremptory challenge, which for centuries"- has allowed li-
tigators to object to a certain number of prospective jurors without
6 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (prohibiting peremptory strikes
based on race); United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 952-53 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding
Batson rule not violated when prosecutor used peremptory challenge to exclude potential
juror of same sex, age, and status as defendant on grounds that juror may sympathize with
defendant). "One of the most regular uses of peremptory strikes is to eliminate from the
final jury venirepersons whom either side believes will be too sympathetic to its opponent."
Id. at 953. Note, however, that the Fourth Circuit decided this case five months before the
Supreme Court extended Batson to gender in J.E.B. Therefore, while the court perhaps
would have reached the same conclusion following J.E.B., it may have given greater consid-
eration to the defense counsel's argument that religious discrimination was the motivating
force behind the strike.
7 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 219 (1965) and Batson, 476 U.S. at 91). "Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side
to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side, are a means of
eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides ... thereby assuring the selection of a
qualified and unbiased jury." 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Holland
v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (noting that peremptory challenges are means of elimi-
nating extremes of partiality on both sides and selecting unbiased jury).
8 See BERGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 164.
9 Id.; see also David Margolick, Many Willing to Serve on Simpson Jury; Most Common
Excuses Are Not Being Offered as Often as Normal, N.Y. TrNms, Sept. 28, 1994, at A14
(quoting Judge Ito, the presiding judge in the O.J. Simpson double murder trial in Los
Angeles). "'I really think this is the greatest burden placed on the court, selecting a jury
.. ' the judge said." Id.
10 SeaNrro & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 2.1. The authors state:
While there is no substitute for the verbal skill of a good attorney articulating the facts
of his case, choosing the right audience to understand and appreciate his craftsman-
ship is of equal importance. It is during voir dire that counsel selects the evaluators of
his presentation. Failure to give this part of the trial adequate attention can lead to a
disastrous verdict even in a well presented case.
Id.
11 Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "[T]he peremptory challenge [is] a
procedure which has been part of the common law for many centuries and part of our jury
system for nearly 200 years." Id. "The peremptory challenge has been in use without scru-
tiny into its basis for nearly as long as juries have existed." Id. at 119; see also J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
peremptory challenge's importance is proven by its persistence; it was well established at
Blackstone's time and continues to endure in all states); Edmonsville v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 639 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (same); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
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assigning cause," is under attack. The Supreme Court, in Batson
v. Kentucky, recognized that some litigators use peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors based on stereotypical racial or ethnic
classifications. 13 The Court held that although peremptory chal-
lenges by their nature did not have to be explained, 4 the Equal
Protection Clause 5 requires attorneys to provide racially-neutral
explanations for suspect challenges, to rebut a prima facie show-
ing of discrimination.1 6
As state courts struggle to apply the Batson rule, 17 the United
States Supreme Court has continued to expand Batson's scope.18
474, 481 (1990) (same); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965) (same); W. FOR-
sYTHE, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 175 (1852) (noting Romans used peremptory challenges
in criminal cases, and Lex Servilia (B.C. 104) enacted type of peremptory challenges);
BERNHARD C. GANT, BLAcKsToNE's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw 907 (1941) (illustrating that
peremptory challenges were established well before Blackstone's time).
12 See supra note 2 (defining peremptory challenge).
13 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. The Court stated: "The reality of practice, amply reflected in
many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortu-
nately at times has been, used to discriminate against [black] jurors." Id.; see SANNrro &
McGOvERN, supra note 4, § 3.10. "One of the juror characteristics that is of greatest con-
cern to old [craftsmen] of the courtroom is ethnic background." Id.; cf JAMEs W. McELHA-
NEY, MCELHANEY'S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 116-17 (ABA Section of Litigation 1994) (discussing
Clarence Darrow's article on picking juries, printed in Esquire magazine in 1935, which
classified jurors based on religious and ethnic stereotypes). "Even some of our finest advo-
cates have fallen for the most outrageous ideas." Id. But see id. "[Ulsing the old courtroom
stereotypes may produce unexpected results." Id.
14 See supra note 2 (discussing definition of peremptory challenge).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that law must treat similarly situated persons
similarly).
16 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). "Exclusion of black citizens from service
as jurors constitutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to cure." Id.; see also id. at 93-94 (explaining that once party makes prima facie
case of discriminatory peremptory challenge, burden shifts to other party to justify exclud-
ing juror).
17 Id. The Court held that a criminal prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory chal-
lenges to eliminate potential jurors who were the same race as the defendant violated that
defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. If one party
objects to the other's use of a peremptory challenge on the grounds it is discriminatory, the
trial court must query into the basis for the challenge. Id. As in civil rights cases, the
Batson inquiry shifts the burden of proof in the following manner:
[F]irst, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exer-
cised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has
been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation
for striking the juror in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991) (citing Batson 476 U.S. at 96-98)
(noting three-step inquiry required to respond to Batson claim).
18 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (extending Batson to prevent de-
fense counsel's use of peremptories based on race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 639 (1991) (applying Batson rule to civil as well as criminal cases); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (holding Batson claim can be raised even when races of
defendant and potential juror differ).
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Recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,' 9 the Supreme Court
extended Batson to preclude peremptory challenges based on gen-
der.2 ° Determining that the Equal Protection Clause2 ' prohibits
gender-based peremptory strikes,22 the Supreme Court for the
first time extended Batson beyond racial classification.23 However,
only one month after deciding J.E.B., the Court in Davis v. Minne-
sota24 denied certiorari to decide whether Batson should be ex-
tended to prohibit peremptory challenges based solely on a pro-
spective juror's religious beliefs, effectively allowing a challenge
on those grounds in the case.25 Therefore, it remains unclear how
far Batson will reach, in the name of equal protection, into the
controversial area of peremptory challenges.26
19 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994) (holding intentional discrimination on basis of gender
violates Equal Protection Clause).
20 Id.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
23 Id. "Although premised on equal protection principles that apply equally to gender
discrimination, all our recent cases defining the scope of Batson involved alleged racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges." Id.; see also Lawrence S. Robbins,
High Court Sends Mixed Messages, N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1994, at S1 (noting J.E.B. marks
Court's first extension of Batson beyond race).
24 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2120 (1994) (denying writ of certiorari to defendant challenging
state's peremptory challenge on grounds of religious beliefs). See State v. Davis, 504
N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994). The Court stated: "Be-
cause religious bigotry in the use of the peremptory challenge is not as prevalent, or fla-
grant, or historically ingrained in the jury selection process as is race, [the court] con-
clude[s] that neither the federal nor [the] state constitution requires an extension of
Batson." 504 N.W.2d at 771; see also Recent Decision, 107 HsAv. L. REv. 1164, 1166-67
(1994).
25 Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993). During jury selection in the Davis trial for ag-
gravated robbery, defendant Davis raised a Batson objection when the prosecutor used a
peremptory strike to remove a juror who was of the same race as Davis. Id. at 768. In
response to Davis's request for a race-neutral explanation for the strike, the prosecutor
said she struck the prospective juror because he was a Jehovah's witness and explained
that "in [her] experience" individuals of this religious affiliation "are reluctant to exercise
authority over their fellow human beings in this Court House." Id. The trial court accepted
this explanation and proceeded to trial; Davis was convicted. Id.
On appeal, Davis argued that even though the prosecutor provided a racially-neutral
explanation for her objection to the juror, the court should extend Batson to prohibit per-
emptory challenges based on religion. Id. at 769. Rejecting Davis's argument, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court noted that Batson had been confined to racial classification and should
not be broadened in this case. Id. at 772.
The Supreme Court decided J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1419 (extending Batson to prohibit per-
emptory challenges based on gender), on April 14, 1994, and denied certiorari in Davis, 114
S. Ct. at 2120, on May 23, 1994.
26 Robbins, supra note 23, at S1 (noting peremptory strikes based on religion appear to
violate same principle elaborated in J.E.B. to prohibit gender-based peremptory strikes).
"It now remains to be seen whether Batson will be extended to peremptory challenges
based on a potential juror's religion .... [I]n time the issue is likely to return to the
Supreme Court." Id. The author suggests that perhaps the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in Davis because the Court was reluctant to address the polemic issue of peremptory
challenges so soon after J.E.B. Id.; see also Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994)
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Preserving peremptory challenges in the wake of the extended
Batson rule27 requires courts and litigators to employ a careful
and deliberate trial strategy.28 They must maintain a careful bal-
ance of due process and equal protection rights29 of litigants and
prospective jurors30  under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.3 1
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding it difficult to understand how Court would not vacate and
remand in light of J.E.B., which shatters lower court's understanding that Batson applies
solely to racially-based peremptory challenges). But see Davis 114 S. Ct. at 2120 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (criticizing, as incomplete, dissent's portrayal of Minnesota Supreme Court's
opinion). Justice Ginsburg stated that the Minnesota court "made two key observations"
when it noted that religious affiliation (or lack thereof) is less self-evident than race or
gender, and it is improper to ask jurors questions regarding their religious affiliation and
beliefs, since this type of voir dire inquiry is "irrelevant and improper." Id. (quoting State v.
Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771-772 (Minn. 1993), noting "proper questioning" should be lim-
ited to asking jurors if they knew of any reason why they could not sit, if they would have
any difficulty in following law as given by court, or if they would have any difficulty in
sitting in judgement)); see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (not-
ing problems that extending Batson to gender causes); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
123-24 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting) (noting possible fatal damage that Batson-type limi-
tations could inflict on peremptory challenge). Burger argued that Batson's new rule might
extend to: gender; age; religious or political affiliation; mental capacity; number of children;
living arrangements; and employment in a particular industry or profession; since all of
these areas could constitute a "classification" subject to equal protection scrutiny. Batson,
476 U.S. at 123-24.
27 See supra note 18 (discussing Batson extensions).
28 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965)). "The principal value of the peremptory is
that it helps produce fair and impartial juries." 114 S. Ct. at 1431; Barbara A. Babock, Voir
Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 549-51 (1975) (stating that
peremptories are important part of selecting fair juries); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 484 (1990).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "[Nior shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2
(granting right to trial by jury in criminal cases); U.S. CONST. amend VI (assuring criminal
defendants "the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury").
30 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2353-54 (1992). The Court in McCollum noted
that the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges extends beyond the litigants in a par-
ticular case. Id. Discriminatory challenges both infringe on the rights of potential jurors to
fulfill their civic duty and threaten to undermine the public's confidence in the justice sys-
tem. Id. See Davidson v. Gengler, 852 F. Supp. 782, 785 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (stating that
harm from discriminatory use of peremptories extends beyond litigants) (citing McCollum,
112 S. Ct. at 2353-54). But see J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor noted that the Equal Protection Clause only applies to state actors. Id She ar-
gued that the Clause mistakenly was held to apply to civil litigants in Edmonson and to
criminal defendants in McCollum. Id. She also noted that subordinating the rights of the
accused to the rights of the jurors was a severe misordering of priorities. Id. at 1432. See
generally Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. REv. 808, 826-33
(1989) (arguing that due to state action requirement of Fourteenth Amendment, prosecu-
tors and defense counsel should be treated differently regarding Batson challenges).
31 U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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Part One of this Note examines the value of peremptory chal-
lenges in ensuring the selection of a fair jury. Part Two considers
the extent to which Batson and its progeny neutralize the funda-
mental principle and ultimate effectiveness of peremptory chal-
lenges in an attempt to ensure equal protection. Part Three of
this Note discusses the parameters within which peremptory chal-
lenges must be protected. This analysis supports preserving per-
emptory challenges without further limitations through a strate-
gic approach to voir dire that requires litigators to look beyond
demographic stereotypes and explore jurors' mental attitudes.
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: CRITICAL TO SELECTING FAIR
JURIES
Although the Sixth Amendment3 2 requires the state to provide
for an impartial jury,33 the courtroom reality inherent in our ad-
versary system demonstrates that attorneys prefer jurors who are
partial toward their case's theory.3 4 Litigators, therefore, gener-
ally try to select venirepersons who fit their "ideal juror" profile for
the case, focusing on a favorable outcome rather than impartial-
ity.35 These venirepersons, from the attorney's perspective, dis-
32 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33 Id. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury .... Id.
34 See BRovINs & OEHMKE, supra note 1, at 80 (providing practical discussion of jury
selection process and techniques). "The objective of jury selection is to secure a jury that
consists of persons who will decide the case in your client's favor. Jurors should have no
predisposition against your case or in favor of your opponent's case." Id. But see id. "As a
rule, you will want to select jurors who appear to be fair-minded and with whom you can
communicate. Eliminate prospective jurors who are incompetent, biased, prejudiced
against your client or cause, or who are strange or too unconventional." Id.
35 See, e.g., V. HALE STAR & MARK McCoRICK, JURY SELECTON: AN ATroRNEY's GuiDE
TO JuRY LAW AND METHODS 214 (1985) (explaining how to conduct demographic analysis of
jury panel and determine which demographic variables will most influence final verdict);
BRovans & OEHMIoC, supra note 1, at 81. The three goals of the jury selection process are:
"to select the ideal jury; to establish a rapport with all jurors; and to begin to indoctrinate
[the jurors]." Id.; see also United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 (4th Cir. 1994). The
court stated:
While parties in some cases have employed sophisticated experts to assist in the jury
selection process, in most cases counsel on both sides attempt in some crude fashion to
reduce the presence of sympathy votes by striking venirepersons having the most obvi-
ous common traits linking them to the other side.
Id.; BERGER ET AL, supra note 4, at 164. "While you may desire jurors biased in your favor,
opposing counsel is not likely to let that happen." Id.
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play personal characteristics that demonstrate a propensity to-
ward that litigator's side.36
Generally, however, these "ideal jurors" may also be the same
venirepersons whom the opposing counsel desires to eliminate
through the use of a challenge for cause or a peremptory chal-
lenge.3 7 It is through this process of voir dire that a fair38 jury,
able to consider equally both sides of the case, is impaneled.3 9
In an effort to determine a potential juror's attitude towards a
particular case, attorneys often rely on stereotypes based on dem-
ographic characteristics. 40 This reliance stems from the hypothe-
sis that there is a consistent relationship between demographic
variables and attitudes toward the issues of a case.41 While demo-
graphic characteristics may provide litigators with some guidance
in choosing desirable jurors, they are not dispositive and often re-
36 See, e.g., BERGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 167. For example, attorneys seek jurors "who
will look favorably on [them], [their] client, [their] witness, and [their] case theory and
render a verdict accordingly." Id.
37 Id. at 164 (providing litigators with practical guide for selecting juries). The author
notes:
[Y]our opposition will try to remove all jurors favorable to you, as you will try to re-
move those favorable to your opponent. Therefore, you must direct your attention to
making certain that the jurors will view the presentation of your case theory on its
merits, without the extraneous distortion that will result from any personal biases
against you, your client, your witnesses, or your theory itself.
Id.
38 See BLAcK's LAw DicTIoNARY 595 (6th ed. 1990). "Fair" is defined as: "just; equitable;
even-handed; equal, as between conflicting interests." Id. Although "fair" and "impartial"
often are used interchangeably, notable semantic distinctions arguably exist. A fair jury
infers that jurors will give equal consideration to both sides of the case, regardless of indi-
vidual biases or predispositions toward one side. Id. "Impartiality," on the other hand, im-
plies a higher standard, indicating that predispositions do not exist. Id. at 752 (defining
"impartial" as: "favoring neither; disinterested; treating all alike; unbiased"); see also id. at
596 (defining "fair and impartial jury" as jury chosen to hear evidence and render verdict
without any fixed opinion concerning guilt, innocence or liability of defendant); Id. at 752
(defining "impartial jury" as having impartial frame of mind at beginning of trial, influ-
enced only by legal and competent evidence produced during trial, and basing its verdict
upon evidence connecting defendant with commission of crime charged).
39 BERGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 164. "You are entitled to a fair shot, not a rigged game.
And if you have thoroughly prepared your case, a fair shot is all you need." Id.; see also
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994). "Voir dire provides a means of
discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise
their peremptory challenges intelligently." Id.
40 See, e.g., STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 35, at 211 (discussing demographic analy-
sis of jury panel). The authors define demographic analysis of venirepersons as "a system of
pretrial analysis for evaluating whether a potential juror's attitudes are likely to favor or
disfavor the view of the issues that will be presented in court by the trial team." Id.
41 Id. at 212; see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "We know that
like race, gender matters. A plethora of studies make clear that in rape cases, for example,
female jurors are somewhat more likely to vote to convict than male jurors." Id. But see
REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 140 (1983). "The majority of studies suggest that
gender plays no identifiable role in jurors' attitudes." Id.
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sult in erroneous generalizations and discrimination. 42 Therefore,
when balancing the due process rights of litigants with the equal
protection interests of litigants and prospective jurors,43 Batson
restrictions on peremptory challenges appear to be justified when
reasonably applied to certain types of discrimination, such as race
and gender.44
II. AFTER BATSON: ARE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES STILL
PEREMPTORY?
Since Batson requires litigators in certain instances to justify
their peremptory challenges,45 some commentators logically argue
that peremptory challenges are no longer "peremptory."46 In the
New York case of People v. Bolling, for example, Judge Joseph
Bellacosa criticized Batson's paradoxical requirement that liti-
gators justify peremptory challenges, which are meant to be made
without explanation. Nevertheless, peremptories still play an
important role in jury selection.48
42 See, e.g., SA Nrro & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 3 (discussing jury characteristics and
predicting verdicts). "Trial attorneys are too frequently put in the position of choosing ju-
rors using folklore, superstitions and desperate hunches." Id. § 3.1; see also BLAcs'S LAw
DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235,
238-39 (C.D. Cal. 1972)). "Discrimination" is defined as: "[u]nfair treatment or denial of
normal privileges to persons because of their race, age, sex, nationality or religion;" and "[a]
failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between
those favored and those not favored." Id.
43 U.S. CONST. amend XIV. "No state shall . .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id.
44 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427 (1994). "Discrimination in
jury selection, whether based on race or gender, causes harm to the litigants, the commu-
nity, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judi-
cial process." Id. The Court's reasoning also logically may be applied to religious discrimi-
nation in the use of peremptory challenges. See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
But see J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Limiting the accused's use
of the peremptory is 'a serious misordering of our priorities,' for it means 'we have exalted
the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it
is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death.'" Id. (citing Mc-
Collum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
45 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986) (requiring race-neutral justifications for
apparently discriminatory peremptory challenges); FED. R. Crm. P. 24; 28 U.S.C. § 1870
(1988). Peremptory challenges, however, are objections to venirepersons that do not require
an explanation. Id.; see also, N.Y. CRI. PRoc. LAw § 270.25(1) (McKinney 1993) (legislat-
ing peremptory challenge; right to object to prospective juror without assigning reason).
46 See People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 326, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950,
956 (1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (discussing Batson's effect on peremptory challenges).
47 Id. "Analytically, peremptories and race-neutral articulations present a quintessential
and untenable dualism. A peremptory challenge by its nature should not have to be ex-
plained ... Batson, of course, necessarily changed that." Id.
4s See id. "Peremptories have outlived their usefulness and, ironically, appear to be dis-
guising discrimination-not minimizing it, and clearly not eliminating it." Id. But see
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Because I believe the peremptory
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Despite Batson's limitations, peremptory challenges require a
lower standard of justification than challenges for cause, 49 and
often allow litigators to strike prospective jurors when the motiva-
tion for the strike might be insufficient to remove the juror using a
challenge for cause. Peremptory challenges also enable litigators
to object to venirepersons for race- or gender-neutral reasons that
they may be unable to articulate. 51 Therefore, although Batson
and its progeny eliminate litigators' unbridled use of peremptory
challenges,52 this right to object to jurors, at least generally with-
out assigning cause, is a valuable tool for selecting fair juries and
should be preserved.
53
remains an important litigator's tool and a fundamental part of the process of selecting
impartial juries, our increasing limitation of it gives me pause." Id.
49 See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (noting that peremptory challenges need not raise to
level of"for cause" challenge, cannot be based on race or gender, and cannot be pretextual);
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1991) (noting lower standard required to
justify peremptory challenge than to sustain challenge for cause).
50 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994). "When an explanation is
required, it need not rise to the level of a 'for cause' challenge; rather, it merely must be
based on a juror characteristic other than gender [or race], and the proffered explanation
may not be pretextual." Id. Whether an explanation is sufficient to defeat a Batson claim is
a matter of the court's discretion. Id.; see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370 (holding court
determines whether litigator's explanation is sufficient to rebut Batson claim of discrimina-
tion). But see Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d at 326 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (discussing courts' diffi-
culty in determining whether litigators' explanations for peremptory challenges are suffi-
cient or merely pretextual). "The process that requires courts to sift through counsel's
words for patterns or pretexts of discrimination has not served the goal of cutting the dis-
criminatory weeds out of the jury selection process." Id.
51 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Our belief that experienced law-
yers will often correctly intuit which jurors are likely to be the least sympathetic, and our
understanding that the lawyer will often be unable to explain the intuition, are the very
reason we cherish the peremptory challenge." Id.; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger argued that "in making peremp-
tory challenges, both the prosecutor and defense attorney necessarily act on only limited
information or hunch. The process cannot be indicted on the sole basis that such decisions
are made on the basis of 'assumption' or 'intuitive judgement.'" Id.
52 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (noting once defendant made prima facie showing of race-based
challenges, burden shifted to state to offer neutral explanation for challenging black ju-
rors); see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-1438 (extending Batson's requirement of prima
facie showing of discrimination to gender-based challenges); Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359
(applying three-step Batson race-based discrimination standard to challenges used to elim-
inate potential Spanish-speaking jurors).
53 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 (limiting restriction on peremptory challenges and specifi-
cally noting that holding is not intended to eliminate all peremptory challenges). "Parties
still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel;
gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias." Id. The Court also pointed out that par-
ties may use peremptory challenges "to remove from the venire any group or class of indi-
viduals normally subject to 'rational basis' review." Id.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 105
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting Batson still allows unconstitutional use of peremptory
challenges, provided discrimination is held to "acceptable" or nonascertainable level); Id. at
107 (noting that "inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by
permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds ideally should lead the Court to ban
them entirely from the criminal justice system"); People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 327
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Although the Supreme Court has applied Batson beyond racial
classifications,54 it remains unclear how far Batson will extend in
the name of equal protection to require litigators to justify their
peremptory challenges. 55 The question of Batson's reach is under-
scored by the recognition that Batson now applies beyond race, an
"inherently suspect" classification demanding the Court's highest
or "strict scrutiny" standard of review for discrimination,5 6 to gen-
der, a less suspect classification that requires only intermediate or
"heightened scrutiny" standard of review.5"
Applying the Court's rationale in J.E.B., it appears that the
Supreme Court also would extend Batson to prohibit peremptory
challenges based on religion, because this classification, like race,
requires the Court's "strict scrutiny" standard of review for dis-
crimination .5  The Court in Davis v. Minnesota,59 however, re-
(1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring). "Perversely, many varieties of discrimination, except the
most overt, flagrant manifestations, appear to be surviving the scrutiny of the half-step
Batson remedy." Id. But see id. at 89 n.12 (eschewing question of whether Constitution
limits exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel).
54 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421 (extending Batson protection to prohibit gender-based
classifications).
55 See, e.g., Lawrence S. Robbins, High Court Sends Mixed Messages, N.Y. L.J., July 11,
1994, at S1 (regarding Court's decision to apply Batson beyond racial classifications). "It
now remains to be seen whether Batson will be extended .... Id.
56 See, e.g., D. KInP ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE 137 (1986) (noting racial equality has proved
more challenging to achieve than gender equality); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
114 S. Ct. 1419, 1435 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting classifications based on race
are inherently suspect, while gender-based classifications are subject to lower standard of
review).
57 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-724 (1982) (requir-
ing "heightened scrutiny" when considering discrimination based on gender). The Court
noted that:
[Tihe party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their
gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
the classification.., the burden is met only by showing at least that the classification
serves "important governmental objectives" and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed "are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
Id. at 724; see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Larson v. Va-
lente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (requiring "heightened scrutiny" regarding discrimina-
tion based on religion)). Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(requiring "most rigid scrutiny," subsequently labeled "strictest scrutiny," when consider-
ing discrimination based on race) with Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439-42 (1985) (requiring "rational basis" review of cases involving discrimination based on
mental capacity) and Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (requiring "rational basis"
review of discrimination based on illegitimacy).
58 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (noting that potential religious dis-
crimination is subject to "strict scrutiny" review); cf United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076,
1086 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993). "Whether Jewish jurors are
viewed as members of a 'race' . . . or a religion, a defendant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges against them is subject to Batson's strictures." Id. at 1086 n.9.
59 See supra notes 24-25 (discussing Davis).
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cently denied certiorari on this issue.60 Dissenting from the
Court's denial of certiorari in Davis, Justice Clarence Thomas,
joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, argued that there seemed to be
no reason for declining to apply the Batson rule to a classification
requiring even "heightened scrutiny" under the Equal Protection
Clause, since the J.E.B. Court already extended Batson to gen-
der.61 However, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurring in the
denial of certiorari, indicated that the state court properly distin-
guished religion from more "self-evident" classifications such as
race and gender.6 2 Justice Ginsburg further noted that the voir
dire inquiry into a juror's religious affiliation and beliefs ordina-
rily is irrelevant, prejudicial, and improper.63 Additionally, Jus-
tice Ginsburg suggested that courts generally should prohibit the
questioning of prospective jurors with respect to their religious af-
filiation, or lack thereof.6 4 Even with such a ban on questioning,
however, courts probably will still need to determine whether Bat-
son extends to religion, because litigators can use juror
demographics, such as surname and appearance, as a basis for
making stereotypical assumptions regarding a juror's religious
affiliation.6 5
The J.E.B. majority found that the purpose of Batson mandated
extending the rule against racial discrimination to prohibit gen-
der-based peremptory challenges. 66 To support its holding, the
60 Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted:
In breaking the barrier between classifications that merit strict equal protection scru-
tiny and those that receive... "heightened" or "intermediate" scrutiny, J.E.B. would
seem to have extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes based on the
latter category of classifications-a category which presumably would include classifi-
cations based on religion.
Id.
61 Id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting lower court based its decision on grounds
Batson was limited to race).
62 Id. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2120 (1994). "This is not to say that religious intolerance does not exist in our society, but
only to say that there is no indication that irrational religious bias so pervades the peremp-
tory challenge as to undermine the integrity of the jury system." Id. But cf United States v.
Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Batson to prohibit defendant from
using peremptory challenges to exclude Jewish venirepersons, even if this discrimination
was based on religious, not racial classification).
66 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (supporting decision to
apply Batson, traditionally limited to race-based discrimination, to preclude classifying ju-
rors based on gender). "Failing to provide jurors the same protection against gender dis-
crimination as race discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson itself." Id.
1995]
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Court expressed concern that if it did not apply Batson to preclude
gender-based strikes, litigators might use gender as a pretext for
eliminating jurors based on race.6 7 Race, however, was not an is-
sue in J.E.B.68 As a result, the Court's ruling is not limited to
cases where racial and gender discrimination might overlap.6 s
Peremptories could perish in light of this reasoning, therefore, be-
cause race and gender coexist with all of the other demographic
classifications that most, if not all, litigators at least consider dur-
ing voir dire. v°
It seems overbroad, however, to interpret J.E.B. as grounds for
eliminating peremptory challenges when considering that the
Court expressly limited its holding to gender and specifically sup-
ported peremptory challenges. 71 Accordingly, the fact that race
and gender overlap other characteristics evidences that the Court
is inclined to limit Batson to the "self-evident" classifications of
67 Id. "Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as a pre-
text for racial discrimination... [serving to] insulate effectively racial discrimination fromjudicial scrutiny." Id. The Court supported this rationale by recognizing that the majority
of lower court decisions extending Batson to gender involve the use of peremptory chal-
lenges to remove minority women. Id. at 1430 n. 18. The Court further noted that all four
gender-based peremptory cases to reach the federal courts of appeals also involved the
striking of minority women. Id. at 1430; see also United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433,
1437-43 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (extending Batson to prohibit gender-based peremptory
challenges in both criminal and civil trials); cf United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215,
220 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to extend Batson to gender); United States v. Nichols, 937
F.2d 1257, 1262-64 (7th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992); United States
v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
68 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421 (noting that excluded jurors' race was not in issue). The
petitioner objected to the State's use of peremptory challenges against male jurors, claim-
ing gender was sole basis of strikes, violating Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1421-22. In
J.E.B., after the trial court excused three jurors for cause, attorneys selected the jury from
a pool of 10 male and 33 female venirepersons. Id. The State used nine of its 10 peremptory
strikes to remove male jurors and the defendant used all but one of his strikes to remove
female jurors. Id. at 1422. As a result, all the selected jurors were female. Id.
69 Id. at 1429. The Court recognized that certain characteristics may be disproportion-
ately associated with one gender but, as long as that characteristic and not gender is the
basis for the strike, the peremptory challenge cannot be said to be unconstitutional. Id.
70 Id. "Before a demographic analysis is of any value in the jury selection process, the
trial attorney should know at least the age, sex, and occupation of every person on the jury
list. Marital status, spouse's occupation, and number of children should also be known."
STARR & McCoRMIcK, supra note 35, § 7.1; see also SARNrro & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 3
(examining impact of demographic variables on jurors' attitudes toward cases, noting that
"[ciharacteristics that mildly predisposed jurors were sex, race, and number of brothers
and sisters").
71 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting that holding does not imply elimination of all peremptory challenges). Id. at
1431 (stating peremptory challenge remains important litigator's tool and fundamental
part of selecting impartial juries).
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race and gender, rather than to extend it so far as to abrogate
peremptory challenges. 2
Despite the J.E.B. Court's limiting language, however, a logical
interpretation of the majority's reasoning indicates that Batson
would restrict peremptory strikes based on numerous classifica-
tions. 73 This is because the Equal Protection Clause, on which the
Court based its decision, applies to discrimination far beyond race
and gender. 4 Consequently, the principles of the Court's equal
protection extension of Batson seem to justify its extension beyond
manifest demographics, such as race and gender, to at least reli-
gion.7 5 Simultaneously, however, the Court seems reluctant to in-
trude further into the litigator's historic and necessary right to
exercise peremptory challenges. 6 Accordingly, the Court should
not extend Batson so far as to subject peremptory challenges to
scrutiny or review based on less invidious uses than Batson and
its progeny already delineate. 7
72 Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2120 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). "Religious
affiliation is not as self-evident as race or gender." Id.
73 Id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that Batson limitations on peremptory
strikes would include classifications based on religion).
74 Id. Justice Thomas argued:
Once the scope of the logic in J.E.B. is honestly acknowledged, it cannot be glibly as-
serted that the decision has no implications for peremptory strikes based on classifica-
tions other than sex, or that it does not imply further restrictions on the exercise of the
peremptory strike outside the context of race and sex.
Id.
75 Id. But cf J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.14 (rejecting argument that all peremptory
challenges are based on stereotypes of some kind).
[Wihere peremptory challenges are made on race or gender (like occupation, for exam-
ple), they do not reinforce the same stereotypes about the group's competence or pre-
dispositions that have been used to prevent them from voting, participating on juries,
pursuing their chosen professions, or otherwise contributing to civic life.
Id. (citing Barbara Babcock, A Place in the Palladium, Women's Rights and Jury Service,
61 U. Cn . L. REv. 1139, 1173 (1993)).
76 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 (noting Batson extension does not imply the elimination of
all peremptory challenges). Justice O'Connor explained that the J.E.B. holding should be
limited to gender so as to prevent further eroding the peremptory challenge. Id. at 1431
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The J.E.B. majority noted:
We do not weigh the value of peremptory challenges as an institution against our as-
serted commitment to eradicate invidious discrimination from the courtroom. Instead,
we consider whether peremptory challenges based on gender stereotypes provide sub-
stantial aid to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.
Id. at 1425-26. It appears that the Court has limited the J.E.B. holding, at least for the
present, in view of its denial to grant certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota. See supra note 65.
77 Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2120 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting
State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993)). "[Rleligious affiliation (or lack thereof)
is not as self-evident as race or gender." 114 S. Ct. at 2120; cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1432 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[T]o say that [gender] makes
no difference as a matter of law is not to say that [gender] makes no difference as a matter
of fact." Id. Rather than asking jurors direct questions regarding their religious affiliation
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III. PARAMETERS FOR PRESERVING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Despite the potency of the Equal Protection Clause and Batson's
fortitude, the Supreme Court seems inclined to preserve peremp-
tory challenges. 78 The Court repeatedly has recognized the impor-
tance of peremptory challenges to ensure a litigant's due process
right.79 Preserving peremptories in the wake of the extended Bat-
son rule, however, requires courts and litigators to balance care-
fully the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion rights ° of litigants and jurors, without eroding effective trial
strategy.
Peremptory challenges have coexisted with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause for 120 years.81 The Batson Court, precluding attor-
neys from basing peremptory challenges on race, recognized that
although the Equal Protection Clause limited the litigator's his-
toric right to peremptory strikes, "the peremptory challenge occu-
pies an important position" in trial procedures.8 2 The Court fur-
ther noted that the rule was not intended to "undermine the
contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration
of justice."8 3 Concurring in J.E.B., Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
agreed that Batson applies to peremptory challenges based on
(or lack thereof), litigators should ask open-ended question geared toward revealing juror
attitudes toward the primary issue of the case. See generally SANNrro & McGovERN, supra
note 4, § 3. But see STARR & McCoRMci, supra note 35, at 23 (noting that while voir dire
enables attorneys to interview potential jurors, it may not reveal fully their biases).
78 See supra note 71 (supporting preservation of peremptory challenges).
79 Id.
80 U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
81 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1436-37 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(attributing coexistence of peremptory challenges and Equal Protection Clause to fact that
all groups are subject to peremptory challenges); see also Mark A. Kornfeld, Comment,
United States v. Gelb: The Second Circuit's Disappointing Treatment of the Fair Cross-
Section Guarantee, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 341, 344 (1991) (since jury is composed of human
beings with human prejudices, impartiality never really can be guaranteed). But cf Davis
v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that subjecting
peremptory strikes to Court's harsh equal protection analysis may eradicate them
altogether).
82 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986); see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1435
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Batson Court was careful not to undermine per-
emptory challenge's significant contribution to administration of justice); see supra note 74
and accompanying text (discussing potential impact of applying Equal Protection Clause to
peremptory strikes). See generally Joshua E. Swift, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discrimina-
tory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 336,
339 n.24 (1993) (noting that eliminating racial discrimination from courtroom has re-
mained fundamental constitutional mandate).
83 Batson, 476 U.S at 98-99.
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gender as well as race,8 4 but expressed reluctance to restrict fur-
ther this important tool for ensuring an impartial jury.85 Soon
thereafter, Justice Thomas, dissenting in Davis, warned that the
Court's J.E.B. ruling threatens to abrogate peremptory chal-
lenges.8 6 Justice Thomas recognized that peremptories could not
endure the stringent test of the Equal Protection Clause, which
proscribes classifications beyond race and gender.87
Recognizing the apparent discord between adhering to constitu-
tional directives for ensuring equal protection88 and employing
practical techniques for attaining fair (or even strategic) jury ver-
dicts,8 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court in Davis refused to extend
Batson to preclude peremptories solely based on a prospective ju-
84 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that only government,
not defendants or private litigants, should be prohibited from using gender-based peremp-
tory strikes). "[Tihe Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from excluding a
person from jury service on account of that person's gender... [blut today's important blow
against gender discrimination is not costless." Id.
85 Id. at 1431. Justice O'Connor stated: "Because I believe the peremptory remains an
important litigator's tool and a fundamental part of the process of selecting impartial ju-
ries, our increasing limitation of it gives me pause." Id.; cf. Brown v. North Carolina, 479
U.S. 940, 942 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that Batson does not apply
"[o]utside the uniquely sensitive area of race").
86 Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). "It has long
been recognized by some members of the Court that subjecting the peremptory strike to the
rigors of Equal Protection analysis may ultimately spell the doom of the strike altogether."
Id. As noted by Chief Justice Burger, peremptory challenges are "an arbitrary and capri-
cious right" to which the Equal Protection Clause, which requires "rationality" in govern-
ment actions, does not apply. Batson, 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
87 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(recognizing Court's decision further erodes peremptory challenge's role). "Once the scope
of the logic in J.E.B. is honestly acknowledged, it cannot be glibly asserted that the decision
has no implications for peremptory strikes based on classifications other than sex, or that it
does not imply further restrictions on the exercise of the peremptory strike outside the
context of race and sex." Id. "In further constitutionalizing jury selection procedures, the
Court increases the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will be-
come part of the main event." Id.
88 Id. at 1430. "[Tlhe Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection
on ... the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason
other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man." Id.
89 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. "[T]o say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law
is not to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact." Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). "The two sexes differ, both biologically and, to a diminishing extent, in experi-
ence. It is not merely "stereotyping" to say that these differences may produce a difference
in outlook which is brought to the jury room." Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see
also SAm-rro & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 3 (discussing results of study measuring juror
characteristics and verdicts). "People of Irish descent, especially women, are significantly
more prone to convict than any other ethnic group studied ... [wiomen convict slightly
more than men.., and women with degrees were significantly more prone to convict more
than to acquit." But see id. § 3.10 (noting that courtroom reliance on ethnic traits is simplis-
tic and often risky).
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ror's religion.90 Distinguishing between "logic[al]" and practical
limits on post-Batson peremptory challenges, the Minnesota court
noted that if logic were to rule over experience, Batson would pro-
hibit many biases, including religious prejudices. 91
The augmented Batson rule mandates that litigants venture be-
yond perfunctory juror classifications to employ a method for se-
lecting jurors that is both constitutional and strategic.92 While
demographic variables may provide crude guidelines during the
initial stage of voir dire,93 they often are inadequate indicators of
an individual's propensity toward a particular viewpoint and,
therefore, an insufficient means for evaluation. 94 It is far more ef-
fective to uncover and evaluate jurors' psychographic95 variables,
90 State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994);
see also State v. Weatherspoon, 514 N.W.2d 266, 277 (Minn. 1994) (Randall, J., concurring)
(explaining that Davis distinguished religious from gender discrimination by presuming
that Batson protection need not extend to religion because peremptory challenges had not
yet attacked religion in Minnesota); State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d 917, 923 (N.C. 1994) (con-
cluding that allowing prosecutor to dismiss juror due to her beliefs regarding death penalty
was not religious discrimination).
91 Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 769. "If the life of the law were logic rather than experience,
Batson might well be extended to include religious bias and, for that matter, an endless
number of other biases." Id.
92 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S.
316, 321 (1906)). "[Tlhe defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria." 476 U.S. at 85-86; see, e.g., BERGER ET
AL., supra note 4, at 167-68 (explaining how to create and use demographic profiles of ideal
and unfit jurors; stereotyping may be crude and inaccurate when applied to individual but
can provide helpful framework for voir dire); BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 1, at 80 (not-
ing demographic analysis of juror's background, characteristics, abilities, and experience,
although important, should not be sole criteria for service as juror). See generally SANNrro
& McGovERN, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that if potential juror appears unfavorable, that
juror's strength of belief or leadership is important in peremptory challenge decision be-
cause it may impact deliberations).
93 BERGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 168 (noting that jury selection process, although de-
pendent on socioeconomic stereotyping, is crude and can be inaccurate when applied to
individuals).
94 Id. at 168-69 (explaining that once attorneys create initial framework for selectingjurors, they must refine their ideas). For example, if a defendant in a robbery case was a
factory worker with a low income, the defense counsel, initially, may want a juror with a
similar profile. Id. However, such a juror may not be favorable if he or she is a hard worker
who despises people who steal. Id.; see also JAMEs W. JEANS, SR., TRIAL ADVOCACY § 9.8 (2d
ed. 1993) (suggesting two-step process for selecting jurors: first, identify relationships with
counsel, client, confederates, and cause; second, use that identification to recognize any
similarities that may exist).
95 ARNOLD MrrcmELL, Tim Nm'E AMERICAN LIFEsTYLEs at vii (1983). Psychographics "de-
scribes the entire constellation of a person's attitudes, beliefs, opinions, hopes, fears,
prejudices, needs, desires, and aspirations that, taken together, govern how one behaves."
Id.; see also HAL HIMMLSTEmN, TELEVISION M=TH AND THE AMIucAN MIND 64 (1984).
"Psychographics moves beyond such often unreliable demographic information as income,
age, sex and place of residence, all of which are incomplete descriptive data rather than
interpretive information." Id. "The ultimate goal of this research approach is to develop a
group's so-called psychographic portrait, consisting of generally applicable personal values,
attitudes and emotions." Id. Both consumer advertisers and political candidates use psy-
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such as personal values and attitudes, rather than to rely on dem-
ographic classifications, such as age and race, as possible indica-
tors of a juror's predisposition toward a particular viewpoint.96
Voir dire provides only a limited time for direct questioning,
during which most people fail to admit openly to unfairness or
bias.97 Skilled litigators, therefore, often must rely on nonverbal,
intuitive skills to gain insight into venirepersons' hidden atti-
tudes, values, and feelings.98 At times during jury selection, attor-
neys must rely on intuition and unidentifiable indicators, such as
a lack of rapport with a juror.99 Peremptory strikes are a particu-
larly important device for eliminating potentially biased jurors in
these instances, because litigators' information about a juror is re-
stricted and their explanations for removing those jurors might
not be sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause. 10 0 Recognizing
this, Justice O'Connor stated that increasing restraints on the use
chographic research to identify and appeal to target audiences. See generally Ronald K.L.
Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEx. L. REv. 697, 706 (1993)
(discussing that psychographics, which are more refined principles than demographics, en-
able advertisers to divide consumers into market segments characterized by particular psy-
chological makeups). "Voter attitudes are studied and the electorate segmented by the
same research strategies [demographics and psychographics] employed for selling pretzels
and beer." Id. at 725-26.
96 See, e.g., SANNrro & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 2.2. The authors assert that exper-
ienced litigators use a number of subtle and sophisticated methods during voir dire to
"tease out" hidden attitudes and predispositions which might affect jurors' judgment dur-
ing deliberation. Id. The authors also note that most of the information that a psychologist
uses to unravel the mysteries of a personality comes from nonverbal, intuitive skills. Id.
Jury selection is most effective when subtle techniques are employed to discover uncon-
scious attitudes, feelings, and beliefs a juror suppresses. Id. § 2.42. An attorney should part
from the traditional, detached methods of jury selection and instead use new methods like
"analyzing suggestibility... and observing nonverbal cues." Id. But see, e.g., STARR & Mc-
CoRwcic, supra note 35, § 7.1. The authors note that a value can be placed on each demo-
graphic characteristic allowing the attorney to assign each juror a specific value. Id.
97 SANNITo & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 2 (discussing voir dire).
98 Id.; see also BROVINS & OEHMEE, supra note 1, § 7.20 (discussing how to read body
language and demeanor of jurors during voir dire). The authors advocate an interpretation
of the whole person: examine clothing, walking style, facial expressions, body position, and
tone of voice. Id. The nuances of human behavior must be studied to determine how a jury
actually might react during deliberations. Id.; JwENs, supra note 94, § 9.11 (determining
that most significant part of jury selection is discovering how prospective jurors will iden-
tify with case's primary issue). Classifying jurors into categories such as ethnicity, occupa-
tion, and religion is "stultifying" and results in improper generalizations. Id. To attain ju-
rors who best identify with the case's issue, the litigator must look beyond demographics
and examine jurors' relationships, experiences, and activities. Id.
99 Id.
100 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting that if peremptory challenges are deterred, lawyers may not use them out of
concern that they could not justify them and court automatically would seat unfavorable
juror).
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of the peremptory challenge forces attorneys to articulate reasons
for strikes that they sometimes cannot articulate. 01'
Beyond relying on nonverbal cues and intuition, however, liti-
gators must also question venirepersons strategically along a cor-
related, rather than direct, line of questioning. 10 2 Indirect ques-
tioning is based on the principle that people generally will not
confess publicly to private biases and prejudices, particularly dur-
ing voir dire, where the focus is on selecting fair and impartial
jurors. 13 For example, the question, "Could you be fair to a homo-
sexual defendant?" would not elicit a potential bias as effectively
as would a less direct line of questioning, such as one regarding a
juror's community involvement, associates, and experiences. 104
Juror's verbal and nonverbal responses to such questions, as well
as to the litigator, provide far more insight than race, gender, or
religious affiliation to determine the juror's capability to evaluate
fairly the attorney's case. '0 5 Furthermore, such responses provide
the attorney with information for avoiding and, if necessary, de-
fending, a Batson claim of discriminatory peremptory
challenges. 10 6
In addition to strategic questioning during voir dire, written ju-
ror questionnaires also can reveal detailed information about the
attitudes and experiences that might influence a juror's perspec-
tive on certain issues.' 0 7 Questionnaires, administered before oral
101 See id. "[Als we add, layer by layer, additional constitutional restraints on the use of
the peremptory, we force lawyers to articulate what we know is often inarticulable." Id.
102 SANNIO & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 2.10. Direct questioning will lead to imperfect
answers because potential jurors will deny their prejudices and biases in an effort to project
a favorable image. Id. However, correlated questioning produces more accurate results be-
cause it isolates the most important psychological attitude in jurors and then examines
jurors through a method that appears unrelated but actually is intimately connected to the
major concern of the litigation. Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.; see also BERGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 174 (developing appropriate juror profile
requires litigator first to use juror-specific profile, then to develop questions that will infer
whether or not juror meets profile). But see BROVINS & OEHN, supra note 1, § 7.27 (not-
ing jurors do not like to be questioned on matters they perceive to be none of counsels'
business and have no immediate bearing on jurors' qualifications).
105 See BRovINs & OEHMnE, supra note 1, § 7.20 (advocating interpreting "whole" person
during jury selection, including body position and tone of voice).
106 See generally BERGER ET AL., supra note 4, passim (discussing jury selection process).
107 Matthew L. Larrabee & Linda P. Drucker, Adieu Voir Dire: The Jury Questionnaire,
21 LrmGATION 1, 37 (1994). "Unlike the older type of juror questionnaires which courts
prepared and asked only for basic demographic information such as age, sex, and employ-
ment history, th[e] new generation of juror questionnaires goes much further." Id. The typi-
cal questionnaire contains a combination of general background questions and case-specific
questions about the juror's attitudes and experiences toward the parties or issues involved
in the particular case. Id. at 39. Generally, questionnaires often ask about attitudes toward
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voir dire, can enable litigators to target their questions during
oral voir dire in order to elicit more effective psychographic infor-
mation in less time. 10 8 Additionally, questionnaires are more
likely to elicit honest responses because they provide a less threat-
ening situation than requiring jurors to reveal personal informa-
tion and beliefs in open court.'0 9
Recognizing that time and pragmatic constraints do not allow
attorneys to ascertain a juror's full psychological profile before the
attorney must select a jury,1 0 litigants often are forced to make
immediate judgments based on probabilities."' Predictions based
on psychographic indicators, such as materials jurors read or or-
ganizations in which they are involved, however, are more accu-
rate and far less objectionable than judgments based on mere
demographic variables." 2
Therefore, an approach to voir dire that is both effective and
constitutional focuses on psychographic, rather than demo-
graphic, characteristics of prospective jurors.. 3 While noting that
the amount of litigation in society and the size of damage awards; whether a juror has had
management or supervisory responsibilities (to assess leadership potential); and which
magazines and newspapers the juror reads regularly. Id. at 40.
108 Id. at 38 (discussing benefits of questionnaires). "With basic information on all mem-
bers of the panel already available in written form, you can obtain better information out of
oral voir dire in less time. Using the jurors' questionnaire responses, you can formulate
different, narrowly-targeted follow-up questions for each juror." Id. "[Miany judges not only
accept but actually encourage such questionnaires because of their enormous time-saving
features." Id.
109 Id. "Many attorneys and jury consultants are convinced that they get more candid
and honest information from the questionnaires than from oral voir dire in open court.
While potential jurors start to sound alike in open court, jurors' responses to written ques-
tionnaires reflect a much broader spectrum of opinions." Id.; see also Aaron I. Reichel, Fur-
ther Jury Reform Proposals, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 1994, at 1 (supporting requirement of back-
ground questionnaires in jury selection). "[W]e should not be meting out justice by
examining skin colors on video screens, but we should be willing and able to screen out the
[biased jurors] in our midst while still protecting their privacy." Id.
110 See ARNE WERCMCK, MODERN CVIL JuRY SELECTION § 19-2 (1988) (discussing time
constraints of civil voir dire). "In the average trial, jury selection is budgeted a relatively
(might we even say, miserably) short time, and the interval between questioning and chal-
lenging is measured in minutes, not hours." Id.
111 Larrabee & Drucker, supra note 107, at 40 (discussing practical benefits of juror
questionnaires). The authors noted:
[T]he reality is that the jury selection process simply doesn't permit lawyers the time
to understand or appreciate the full subtlety or complexity of each individual jurors'
psyche. Therefore, in the real world, lawyers are forced to make snap judgments based
on probabilities. The point of the juror questionnaire is to ask enough questions-par-
ticularly open-ended questions that allow the juror to express himself in his own
words-to get a better sense of the juror's opinions and personality.
Id.
112 See id. (discussing indicators that help reveal juror's opinions and personality).
113 See SANNrro & McGovwN, supra note 4, § 2.2. The authors entertained serious
doubts as to whether the Sixth Amendment could be upheld solely through a litigator's
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certain demographic variables, such as age and occupation," 4 can
indicate a venireperson's propensity toward a particular view-
point," 5 litigators must query beyond stereotypical and often er-
roneous indicators. After all, it is mental attitudes, not
demographics, that truly determine whether a juror is sufficiently
impartial to evaluate the case." 6
CONCLUSION
Selecting a jury in the wake of Batson jury compels litigators to
probe beyond mere demographic distinctions, such as race and
gender, to determine the psychographic variables that make the
individual a preferable or potentially adverse juror in a particular
case. While demographic characteristics may provide initial
guidelines for voir dire, litigators cannot assume that these
demographics evidence mental attitudes toward the trial, case
topic, litigant, and litigator. Therefore, during voir dire a litigator
must analyze venirepersons' verbal and nonverbal communica-
tions, and evaluate the constitutionality of the litigator's own in-
tuitive preferences. This strategic approach to voir dire, which ex-
reliance on direct query techniques. Id.; see also RicARaD D. RmiKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN,
COMMUNICATION iN LEGAL ADVOCACY 77-78 (1990) (noting that poor record of selecting ju-
rors on demographic and personality variables has convinced many lawyers to employ so-
cial science methodologies to identify juror bias and pre-elect juror receptivity). See BERGER
ET AL., supra note 4, at 174. "Juror-personal," general trial, and case-specific questions,
carefully structured and posed, should provide information that enables a litigator to deter-
mine whether to strike a juror, and sufficient grounds for the strike. Id. A strategic line of
inquiry targeted toward uncovering juror attitudes, therefore, should enable the attorney
to exclude jurors for reasons beyond race or gender, and would facilitate the attorney's
explanation of the peremptory challenge, if necessary. Id.
114 See generally SANNrro & McGovERN, supra note 4, § 3.10. "One of the most critical
items of information to know about prospective jurors are their occupations." Id.; REEE &
STurmAN, supra note 113, at 73. Although demographic variables of age, education, status,
and occupation have not been substantially studied to determine their influence on ver-
dicts, juror age has been subject to the most analysis. Id. The consistent finding has been
that younger jurors usually acquit more often than older ones. Id. Other studies have found
that the socioeconomic disparity between defendants and jurors influences verdicts; usually
the greater the disparity, the greater the likelihood of a conviction. Id.
115 See, e.g., JEANS, supra note 94, § 9.6 (recognizing that voir dire is not selection pro-
cess but, actually, system of elimination); STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 7.1 (noting
relationship between demographic variables and juror attitudes). All other variables being
equal, a litigant may use peremptory challenges to choose certain jurors over others, to
safeguard against actual or implied juror bias that may not emerge during voir dire.
116 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). "Jur[or] competence is an
individual rather than a group or class matter." Id.; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 528 (1975). "The selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section... is an
essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." Id.; cf id. at 528.
Although drawn from a cross-section of the community, however, every jury may not neces-
sarily contain representatives of each economic, social, religious, or political group of the
community. Id.
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tends beyond invidious classifications based on stereotypical
generalizations, provides litigators with more reliable grounds for
selecting jurors as well as a more effective basis for defending per-
emptory challenges, should a Batson claim arise. Peremptory
challenges, therefore can be a valuable and constitutional tool for
the litigator. Peremptories should be preserved as an instrumen-
tal means for ensuring the constitutional right to an impartial
jury.
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